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Abstract 
We apply an international relations framework and the notion of multilateral organizations as 
a means of understanding the nature of trade union internationalism, the conditions under 
which it operates. We argue that international trade unionism involves an imperfect 
multilateralism which requires close working relationships between small groups of unions in 
order to function, that is, a ‘minilateral’ method of working. By using this framework we 
attempt to highlight the intrinsic durability and adaptability of the Global Unions and also 
identify areas of activity that serve to strengthen them as organisations, primarily by building 
affiliates’ engagement and investment in them. 
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Introduction 
Much of the literature on the international trade union movement is under-theorized. 
International trade union organizations comprise numerous affiliates with marked 
differences in membership strength and material resources, and conflicting 
ideologies and identities. How in practice are policies shaped and decisions taken? 
Formal constitutional provisions tell us little. As an approach to an answer, we apply 
an international relations framework, and in particular the notion of multilateral 
organizations, as a means of understanding the nature of trade union 
internationalism, the conditions under which it operates and the problems which it 
currently faces..  
 The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) is an international 
organization of national trade union confederations. It has 305 affiliated member 
organizations from 151 countries and territories, with a total membership of 176 
million workers. It is closely linked to the international organizations of occupational 
or industrial trade unions, the ten Global Union Federations (GUFs) (previously 
known as International Trade Secretariats), which date back in some cases to the 
late nineteenth century. Together the ITUC and GUFs have adopted the collective 
label ‘Global Unions’. The relative lack of attention among academics and the 
general public to international trade unionism is curious when one bears in mind that 
they are, along with faith groups, the world’s largest membership organizations. They 
have great though often hidden influence on other international bodies, national 
governments, trade union movements and civil society. Yet their very size is 
indicative of the problem we address here: the difficulty for very large democratic 
organizations to operate effectively.  
 Archer (2001: 33) defines international organizations as ‘formal, continuous 
structure[s] established by agreement between members... with the aim of pursuing 
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the common interest of the membership’ and with core functions which include norm 
and rule setting and providing information, socialization and articulation between 
members. This definition clearly applies to the Global Unions, which even more than 
most other international organizations are founded on the principle of internal 
democracy (Webb and Webb 1920). In order to operate successfully, they must not 
only act efficiently on behalf of their membership but be able to engage their 
membership in order to achieve their objectives. (Offe and Wiesenthal 1985). We 
argue that the existence of multilateral structures is necessary for genuinely global 
trade union activity to take place, but that what exists is an imperfect multilateralism 
which requires close working relationships between small groups of unions in order 
to function effectively. We further argue that union capacity to carry out international 
solidarity action requires a robust relationship between members which can only be 
developed by working in a ‘minilateral’ way with small groups of affiliates.  
 For most of its history, international trade unionism has been beset by 
ideological, regional and organizational cleavages. Most of the literature has focused 
on ideological cleavages, with the primary dividing lines being between social-
democratic, christian and communist organizations (Carew 1987, MacShane 1992). 
At its creation in 2006, the ITUC united for the first time affiliates of the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the inheritor of the social-democratic 
tradition, and most of the affiliates of the much smaller World Confederation of 
Labour (WCL), derived from the christian tradition, along with a number of important 
ex-communist unions (previously affiliated to the World Federation of Trade Unions, 
WFTU) and other independent unions. What were once inter-organizational 
ideological divisions now had to be managed within the new unified organization. The 
second major basis for division, geographical differences, is more significant today 
than ever. There have long been significant differences between the ideas, practices 
and priorities of the unions of the industrialised countries and those of the 
industrialising countries. All the Global Unions have their headquarters in Europe, 
mainly in Brussels and Geneva, where the weight of membership and financial 
resources has always been concentrated, although most of them also possess 
regional structures including committees, offices and staff. The regional structures do 
not necessarily resolve the differences of interests, resources and perspective 
between these two groups. A third basis for division is the more practical one 
between organisations like the ITUC and its predecessors (ICFTU etc.), which are 
based on national centres, and the GUFs, based on industrial unions. While the 
GUFs retain a formal autonomy in the new structures, they are now more closely 
linked to the new global body, the ITUC, but it remains to be seen how effectively this 
closer link will operate in practice. 
 
What do Global Unions do, and why do they do it 
 
Scholars and practitioners of international trade unionism give different answers to 
the questions of why unions act internationally, and what they do. Many view trade 
union internationalism as a response to the internationalization of both product and 
labour markets, which entails that wages and working conditions can no longer be 
defended by action purely at the national level. This was the position of Charles 
Levinson, general secretary of the International Chemical and Energy Workers’ 
Federation, who led the drive for World Company Councils in the 1960s-70s 
(Levinson 1972). In recent years this challenge has been conceptualized in terms of 
globalization, with the growing power of multinational companies (MNCs), the 
unequal relationship between rich and poor nations and the threat of a ‘race to the 
bottom’ in terms of labour costs and employer practices (Logue 1980, Ramsay 1997, 
1999). Similar arguments, however, were made by early advocates of international 
trade union organization, such as Edo Fimmen, general secretary of the International 
Transportworkers Federation (1924). Other authors present the case for a 
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transnational trade union response in terms of solidarity, a concept which refers both 
to the principle of common action with others and to the identification of one’s own 
interests with theirs (Hyman 1999, Lorwin 1953, Zoll 1996). For members of the 
Global Unions, this involves the commitment to support other members in response 
to conflicts with employers, both locally and internationally, in order to protect 
standards for working people everywhere. Solidarity can however be conceived in 
two contrasting senses: first, as a normative or moral principle which creates an 
obligation to support other workers and their unions in case of need; second, as a 
form of ‘enlightened self-interest’ (Collier, 2008: 247, Logue 1980, Ramsay 1997) 
with only weakly ethical underpinning, motivated by the belief that an injury to one is 
(sooner or later) an injury to all. The tension between these two conceptions of 
solidarity has generated dilemmas for international trade union organization, in part 
because the practical benefits of solidarity actions are often difficult to identify and 
take many years to bear fruit. 
 A second dilemma concerns the orientation of action. This may be internal, 
focused around the sector or industry the organisation represents, particularly in the 
case of the GUFs and their predecessors: Global Unions seek to align the policies 
and activities of affiliates in order to pool resources and prevent damaging 
downwards pressure on standards. The rationale is that effective collective action will 
enable unions through their own efforts to counteract the challenges of globalization. 
 The other orientation is external, focused on action at a more general and 
political level. The ITUC in particular has conceived much of its role in terms of 
engaging with other actors at international level, especially the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and other UN institutions. The International Federation of Trade 
Unions (IFTU), a predecessor of today’s ITUC, was deeply involved in the creation of 
the ILO in 1919 (Van Goethem 2000: 80-2) and was a ready-made interlocutor for 
the new organization. Within the ILO’s tripartite structure – its Governing Body draws 
half its members from national governments and a quarter each from workers’ and 
employers’ organizations – the ITUC and its predecessors the ICFTU and IFTU have 
always effectively controlled the workers’ side. To an important extent, the ITUC (like 
its forerunners) and the ILO confer legitimacy and recognition on each other. This 
relationship has become increasingly important in recent years, as globalisation has 
brought international labour relations affairs into greater prominence, and as a result 
of institutional change within the UN system, in particular within the ILO (Fröhlich 
2007). These changes were stimulated by a number of international developments 
(Haworth and Hughes 2003) including the end of the Cold War, increased concern 
about social protection and the linking of world trade and labour standards. The ITUC 
has strongly supported the ‘decent work’ agenda launched in 1999 by the newly 
appointed ILO director-general, Juan Samovía. Closely linked to this agenda was the 
priority given – from among the multiplicity of ILO conventions – to a set of core 
labour standards relating to freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
prevention of forced labour, elimination of the worst forms of child labour and 
prevention of discrimination in employment. 
 Similarly, while the GUFs have long focused on MNCs, work on this issue has 
become even more important following the recent process of company mergers and 
acquisitions (Schmidt, 2002). This process has stimulated a new area of work for the 
GUFs in their efforts to resist the competitive downwards pressure by MNCs on 
national standards. National unions lack the capacity to influence corporate policy 
without concerted international cooperation, and the response has therefore been the 
attempt to negotiate transnational agreements, usually in the form of International 
Framework Agreements (IFAs).  
 These global developments have increased the incentives for national unions 
to cooperate globally, providing both concrete benefits but also broader advantages, 
such as providing thinking, coordination and opportunities for joint action. But Global 
Unions are faced with an internal conflict between two competing realities of supply 
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and demand. The first reality stems from their success in affiliating trade unions from 
outside the OECD countries which provided their traditional core, and the fact that 
their legitimacy demands that this process of recruitment continue, perhaps even to 
include China. Yet in most non-OECD countries, unions have few fee-paying 
members (even though they may attract wide-scale support), whereas membership 
numbers (and hence financial resources) have been declining throughout the 
traditional industrialized world. The second is that, as indicated above, the need for 
effective international trade unionism becomes ever greater with the acceleration of 
economic internationalization, itself driven by the priorities of the international 
financial institutions (IFIs) and key national governments (notably the USA), which 
the Global Unions strive to little effect to counteract. 
 There are enormous cultural, organizational and political differences between 
unions that make cooperation particularly difficult at the international level. It is hard 
for new and even sometimes established member unions fully to understand the 
position of other members or to appreciate how to navigate an international setting, 
even with today’s greater possibilities for transport and communication. The 
language barrier remains significant at the world level, especially for less educated 
trade unionists, and it remains one of the key capacities of the Global Unions to 
integrate information and experience from a diverse membership and use it not only 
to facilitate communication between them but also to forge common values and 
priorities for action. This is essential for all international organisations: As Kratochwil 
argues (1993: 448), a central function of international organizations ‘is the 
interpretation of the “facts” and inferences about motivations’, and Windmuller (1967, 
1987 ) and others agree that this is equally true of the day-to-day work of the Global 
Unions. 
 
Global Unions: The regional dimension and the issue of resources 
The work of the global unions can be divided into three main areas (Croucher and 
Cotton, 2009). The first is the defence of affiliated unions, usually through direct 
solidarity action in support of a particular dispute or problem. The second is to further 
the interests of trade unions within international and inter-governmental 
organisations, in recent years mainly through pursuing international negotiations with 
employers, using company networks and International Framework Agreements 
(IFAs). The third is capacity-building for unions in less developed parts of the world, 
carried out primarily through long-term development work, in particular education 
programmes.  
 The ICFTU was the first peak-level international trade union organisation to 
establish regional organizations for the Americas (including both North and South 
America), Asia and Africa shortly after its foundation in 1949; its rivals the largely 
communist WFTU and the christian CISC, predecessor of the WCL, soon followed 
suit. In the new climate of the cold war trade union organization was seen as an 
essential part of a greater ideological battle. De-colonisation offered many 
opportunities for trade union growth in newly independent states, where trade unions 
had often played a key role in the independence struggle. All three internationals 
found themselves competing for affiliates, a competition that created opportunities for 
corruption and opportunism on all sides. Many of the organizational problems evident 
today originated in the 1960s, particularly the struggle of the regional structures to 
achieve a sustainable basis of paying affiliates and to reduce the reliance on 
externally funded projects. By the early 1990s the GUFs were establishing regional 
structures and offices, directing the bulk of their dues income towards building a 
genuinely global membership. This included integrating unions from the former 
Soviet Union and attempting to incorporate unions from the Middle East. .At the 
European level, the ICFTU also set up a European regional organization, which 
became moribund and then gave way in 1973 to the independent European Trade 
Union Confederation (ETUC), which soon admitted affiliates of the WCL and former 
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affiliates of WFTU. The rise of an autonomous European regional body thus paved 
the way for the foundation of the ITUC, but also encouraged a greater focus on 
European affairs among European trade unions, sometimes to the detriment of 
international trade union solidarity (Windmuller 1976, Gumbrell-McCormick 2000). As 
Traub-Merz and Eckl have noted (2007: 4), ‘organisational autonomy necessitated a 
division of labour which repeatedly called for difficult compromises – especially on 
issues affecting European foreign-trade interests – between an ETUC with a more 
protectionist profile and an ICFTU bound to solidarity with trade unions from 
developing countries.’ 
 There have been marked variations both within and between the regions in 
terms of economic and social development, levels of trade union membership and 
financial and organizational resources. At the beginning of the 1970s, union 
organization was relatively strong in Asia, while in Africa it was clearly weakest, 
meaning that effective regional organization was possible only with substantial 
external support (Croucher and Cotton 2009). The majority of the Global Unions 
brought together two completely distinct regions, North and South America, with the 
USA and Canada largely subsidising this work. In the case of the ICFTU, the regional 
body ORIT (Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores) was widely 
criticised as a channel for US foreign policy, supporting corrupt and unrepresentative 
but anti-communist Latin American unions in the 1960s and 70s, before a ‘clean up’ 
in the 1980s (Gumbrell-McCormick 2000). In contrast, the WCL had a separate 
regional organization for South America, CLASC (later renamed CLAT) (Central 
Latinoamericana de Trabajadores) that prided itself on its autonomy from North 
America and gained considerable influence among all those opposed to the US 
domination of ORIT. How to deal with the Americas was to be one of the most 
contentious issues in the creation of the ITUC and has been resolved only by the 
creation of regional sub-structures which allow North and South America to operate 
largely independently. A different issue arose in the case of Europe, where – as 
noted above – the ETUC was autonomous from the Global Unions. The solution was 
to create a Pan-European Regional Council (PERC) within the ITUC; the ETUC 
general secretary holds the same office within PERC. In practice, the latter focuses 
on trade union issues in Eastern Europe, beyond the boundaries of the European 
Union (EU). 
 The ETUC and ITUC share a headquarters building, the International Trade 
Union House in Brussels. But the European organization is significantly better 
resourced. Though the ITUC charges its wealthiest affiliates higher affiliation fees 
than the ETUC – in 2010, €197 per thousand members as against €161 – the 
majority of ETUC membership belongs to the higher-fee affiliates, whereas the 
opposite is the case with the ITUC. In addition, the ETUC benefits from substantial 
resources from the EU, in particular for its research, education and health and safety 
agency, the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI). The differences are reflected in 
staffing. The ITUC, with its global remit, lists 74 headquarters staff in 2011. The 
ETUC lists 52, with an additional 64 in the ETUI. The latter has 20 research staff with 
a direct input into the ETUC policy process; the three ITUC policy departments 
(Human and Trade Union Rights, Economic and Social Policy and Equality) together 
have 17. 
 For many unions in developing and transition countries, contact with a Global 
Union was their first possibility to establish relationships with trade unions outside 
their own country, and sometimes inside, on a basis of relative equality. In most parts 
of the world, in particular in countries under military dictatorships and in the former 
Communist bloc, trade unions, and in particular any international contacts, were 
heavily controlled by governments. Subsequently, democratization often went hand 
in hand with economic liberalism, and unions faced dramatic changes in the structure 
of their industries and the employment relationship, and often faced foreign 
employers for the first time. Affiliation to a Global Union was thus a highly attractive 
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option and provided both contact with the outside world and internal prestige as well 
as educational and financial resources for union work. This was particularly 
pronounced in the case of the former Soviet Union. Unions in these countries 
typically cost more for the Global Unions in development aid than they bring in  
affiliation fees. 
 As noted above, unions in most developed countries have experienced a 
steady decline in the number of workers paying subscriptions (Visser 2011). This is 
in part due to increased unemployment but also the shift from manufacturing to 
private services, and more recently the squeeze on public sector employment, which 
almost universally is a trade union stronghold. Also of great importance is the growth 
of insecure working arrangements such as short term contracts, temporary agency 
work, homeworking, subcontracting and ‘dependent self-employment’. While the 
extent of the ‘informal economy’ has long presented a serious obstacle to 
unionization in developing countries, the growth of precarious work forms in OECD 
countries has similar effects (Heery and Salmon 2000; Gumbrell-McCormick 2011; 
Standing, 2011).  
 These developments are to an important extent associated with the rise of 
neoliberalism, which has driven the promotion of employment flexibility and 
encouraged deregulation of markets more generally, and has greatly empowered the 
global corporations (Crouch 2011). The latter have put pressure on traditionally well 
organized industrial sectors (Hayter, 2009; Holdcroft, 2009) and regions through the 
exploitation of global production chains. Such trends have been a major focus of 
analysis and pressure by the Global Unions, though with limited success in stemming 
the neoliberal tide. 
 Precarious workers are difficult to organise for a broad range of reasons. 
Precarious work is dominated by women and ethnic minorities who have traditionally 
been weakly organized by unions in most parts of the world outside Scandinavia 
(Wrench and Virdee, 1996; Young, 2009). Perceived vulnerability to job loss and 
victimization also make unionization difficult. In some countries, moreover, there are 
specific legal constraints on the right of workers on ‘atypical’ contracts to organize 
and to bargain collectively (ILO 2009). 
 These changes in the employment relationship have provoked a profound 
questioning and repositioning of trade union activity and structures, not least in how 
unions organise (Frege and Kelly 2004; Phelan 2007; Webster et al. 2008). Unions 
have in most parts of the world attempted to find new organising techniques to reach 
new industries and work arrangements, such as the use of online campaigning and 
recruiting (Lee, 1996; Hayter, 2009). However there is little evidence that a ‘new’ 
organizing model has enabled unions to replace previously permanent memberships 
with precarious ones.  
 Membership decline has been reflected in a reduction of payments to the 
Global Unions, and often an increased incidence of late payment of affiliation fees, a 
significant problem for the international organizations which possess few if any 
financial reserves. Financial information is not readily available for all the Global 
Unions, but reports from the ICFTU and ITUC give a broad indication of trends. 
According to the ICFTU Millennium Review in 2000-01, total income was US$60 
million per year from membership dues, additional donations and development 
cooperation funds raised externally. Between 1999 and 2003, an additional US$70 
million of donations and project funds was channelled through its regional structures. 
During the period 1994-2001 real value fee receipts per member dropped by 22 
percent. Despite an increase in declared membership of 28 million during 1999-2003, 
there was a drop of 12.4 percent in paying membership. The ITUC reported a rise in 
declared membership of more than 10 million between 2007 and 2009, but paying 
membership barely increased. Table 1 presents fees received by region for the 
ICFTU in 1998 and 2003, and for the ITUC in 2009. It is important to note that 
affiliation fees are weighted by the level of national income in each country; in 2009 
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the fee was €191.45 per thousand members for unions from the richest countries, 
only €3.1 for those from the poorest; the GUFs have similar arrangements, as has 
the ETUC. This weighting means that any fall in paying membership in the wealthiest 
countries has a disproportionate impact on the resources of the Global Unions. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
In addition to financial resources, intangible resources such as technical expertise 
and political influence are also unevenly distributed across the Global Unions. 
Historically, the staff of Global Unions have tended to come from the most developed 
countries, in particular from the Low Countries, the Nordic countries, and more 
recently the English-speaking countries. The leading role of certain nationalities is 
even apparent at the regional level: English speakers from the Indian sub-continent 
long dominated Asian regional affairs, although their place has now largely been 
taken by the Japanese. The higher level of education and greater language 
knowledge of citizens of these countries is the probably the main reason for this 
phenomenon, but these are also the richest and most influential affiliates, and their 
over-representation within the staff only adds to the imbalance within the global trade 
union structures. 
 As a result of the imbalance of funds and concentration of expertise among 
staff at the secretariat level, regional organizations have tended to act as recipients 
of policies or resources, rather than initiators. Although the Global Unions vary 
constitutionally in the status and structure of regions, all are to some degree 
centralized decision-making bodies. Their formal decision-making structures have 
evolved over time to reflect their changing membership composition, and in particular 
to improve the representation of women and of affiliates from the developing and 
transition countries. Most base formal voting power on the number of dues-paying 
members, and suspend the voting rights of affiliates who fail to pay their fees. 
However, formal voting generally occurs only at the end of the decision-making 
process, leaving the core policy and strategy decisions to regional and international 
committee meetings and informal negotiations between the leaders of key affiliates 
who play a leading role on these committees and contribute the bulk of resources 
(usually the Germans, Nordics, North Americans and Japanese).  
 This is not to say that a union’s international influence depends only on 
membership numbers and financial contributions. Authority, understood as the ability 
to act upon others or upon organizational structures, also derives from internal 
qualities (knowledge, experience, strength of personality or resilience). There are a 
number of different types of authority held by unions beyond contribution authority, 
based on political and moral weight (Croucher and Cotton, 2009). Political authority 
changes over time, with the South African unions having come to represent one of 
the most admired political movements. Moral authority comes through a union’s 
ability to withstand extreme pressure: currently unions from Colombia and Iraq are 
seen as having an exceptional position in international activities because of the 
climate in which they operate. Over the history of the international trade union 
movement, there have been a number of influential leaders from the developing 
countries, but this does not change the general imbalance of resources and 
influence. 
 In addition to affiliation fees, the ITUC receives roughly €1 million a year in 
voluntary contributions to its Solidarity Fund, just over half coming from its German 
and Japanese affiliates. Far more substantial – about €7 million a year – are the 
project-oriented Development Aid Funds. Almost half this funding is provided by the 
Dutch government and trade unions, with other substantial contributions from the 
Swedish unions and the ILO. These are advanced and well organized funding 
sources but largely depend on the political support of national governments. Given 
the political shifts in Western Europe, the funds are increasingly dependent on the 
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ability to show concrete outputs and benefits for the donor countries. In many cases, 
these funds are earmarked for specific projects, often entailing a bilateral relationship 
between donor and recipient countries and unions.This bilateralism can be seen as 
subversive of the broader collective solidarity which the Global Unions aim to 
represent (Gumbrell-McCormick 2000b, 2001). 
 Another observable trend has been for unions to turn their focus inward 
toward their own regions. This is especially true in Europe, where unions have 
increasingly focused on intra-regional relationships and on the EU structures at the 
expense of wider international work (Gumbrell-McCormick 2000a, 2002). On some 
analyses, the unions of Western Europe – the Global Unions’ main paymasters – 
have come to regard European economic integration as a more immediate concern 
than globalization, privileging their relationship with the ETUC. The latter, in its most 
recent Activity Report (ETUC 2011), a hundred-page document, devoted just three 
pages to global issues. This can be understood as another threat to the Global 
Unions, which require the substantial contributions of their wealthier affiliates to 
achieve collective goals. A similar phenomenon has arisen in the Asian-Pacific 
region, where the numerical and financial weight of the Japanese confederation 
RENGO allows it to dominate trade union developments in Asia (as the unions of the 
Indian sub-continent did before it). 
 Politically, both the imbalance of power and resources between regions and 
the increasing internal focus within regions are problematic for the Global Unions. 
Bilateral and regional organization leaves the power dynamics between trade unions 
from the global North and South intact, subordinating international priorities to the 
interests of the key players. When their interests change, the arrangement itself may 
prove precarious. A key advantage of multilateralism is that it is an attempt to govern 
globally, and as a result the participation of all affiliates is sought, which in turn 
implies a high degree of democratization affecting levels of communication between 
the governed and the governing¸ rules and accountability of global union officials.  
 Despite the generally accepted need for trade unions to have international 
multilateral structures, the affiliates of the Global Unions have proved remarkably 
reluctant to address an evident resource crisis. Unions facing declining membership 
at home naturally find it difficult to commit to paying higher amounts to their 
international organizations. Yet what is striking is the lack of argument and energy 
devoted to the problem by national affiliates within their own structures and decision-
making bodies, perhaps reflecting an ambivalence towards membership of the 
Global Unions. There is, we argue, a tension between the broad principles of 
multilateralism and the specific and complex actions required to carry them out. This 
is clear in the case of solidarity: the policy itself is virtually unchallengeable among 
trade unions, but there is far less consensus on the specific and demanding actions 
needed in order for these principles to be pursued at global level. 
 We attempt below to use international relations theories to understand this 
tension. After introducing the concepts of multilateralism and multi-level governance, 
we discuss Olson’s ‘problem of large numbers’, which suggests that organizations 
with large membership will always struggle to develop the motivation to participate 
actively in multilateral structures, threatening their organizational coherence. We 
refer briefly to the literature on institutional entrepreneurs, advocacy coalitions and 
policy communities, then turn to Kahler’s notion of ‘minilateralism’ – the practice of 
working in smaller groups with a resulting higher degree of consensus, clarity and 
closeness – in order to conceptualize the development of more robust international 
relationships between unions. This entails a ‘disguised’ multilateralism where 
minilateral relations are framed within a multilateral structure. Using the idea 
developed by Ruggie of the ‘elasticity’ of multilateral structures, we conclude that 
multilateralism as a concept has ‘heuristic fruitfulness’ (Kratochwil, 1993: 443) in 
relation to the durability of the global unions. 
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Placing Global Unions within an international relations theoretical frame 
Multilateralism and multi-level governance 
Though multilateralism is a dominant characteristic of international institutions, it is 
still a relatively weakly defined concept. A definition widely used in international 
relations literature is by Ruggie: 
 
“an institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more states on 
the basis of generalized principles of conduct; that is, principles which specify 
appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularist 
interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any 
specific occurrence.” (Ruggie, 1993:77)  
 
Caporaso (1993: 54) adds that multilateralism is also a ‘conception of how the world 
might be organized’. Multilateralism can apply broadly to international regimes, rules 
and decision-making procedures, such as the international labour standards regime 
(Haworth and Hughes, 2003) and more formalized organizations such as the ILO. 
Multilateral regimes, in essence, involve working relationships between states on the 
basis of agreed rules and principles, and offer a structure where states can 
potentially develop an agenda for global governance.  
 Two important characteristics of multilateralism that Ruggie emphasises are 
that it is both durable and adaptive. These characteristics are in part a consequence 
of the kinds of principles on which multilateral organizations are based: they apply to 
all members and across all particular moments in time or interests. This gives 
multilateral arrangements their adaptive and ‘reproductive’ capacity. In addition, most 
multilateral regimes or organizations rely on the intense cooperation and investment 
of sub-sets of members, who are willing to sustain organization despite the higher 
costs they incur, as we discuss below through the concept of ‘k-groups’.  
 The principles and activities of a multilateral form need to resonate with 
domestic environments, or to reflect the values and cultures of key members. Ruggie 
(1993:10) points to the cohesive effect of collective defence against an external 
force: multilateral organization constitutes a ‘collective-security system’. Elsewhere 
(Ruggie1982), in his discussion of ‘embedded liberalism’, he notes that the post-1945 
global governance regime was shaped by US dominance and development of free 
trade agenda. It can be argued that the supposed benefits of entering into a system 
of embedded liberalism have never been realised in developing countries (Bull and 
McNeill, 2007), because it has not provided sufficient benefits to compensate for the 
negative effects of involvement in international markets and free trade regimes.  
 The interaction between actors at national and supranational levels is a key 
theme of the literature on multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks 2003). This 
concept, developed primarily in analysis of the EU, points to the process of 
negotiation and accommodation between national and supranational (and sometimes 
also sub-national) actors as an essential ingredient in successful policy formation. 
The multi-level character of multilaterism and supranationalism is an essential insight 
for the study of trade union internationalism. 
 
Generalized principles 
As suggested earlier, the key ‘generalized principle’ underlying trade union 
multilateralism is the idea of solidarity. In abstract terms this has resonance with 
trade union members, but educational and campaigning activities by national unions 
are often necessary to reinforce and make real this sense of solidarity among the 
membership, particularly younger members who do not automatically identify with 
solidarity as an ideologically based ideal. However, within trade union membership 
there is often a deep understanding of the importance of collectivism, a key motivator 
for joining a union and a real and evident benefit to members. Such understanding 
profoundly shifts the perception of the importance of alliances with workers in other 
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locations, including other countries (Zoll 1996). 
 This idea of solidarity as ‘enlightened self-interest’ (Logue 1980) is a long way 
from the internationalism which underlies early international socialist trade unionism, 
although Fimmen (1924) managed to combine the two approaches. Early Christian 
trade unionism was also based on solidarity, although it was closer to the christian 
conception of charity. The contemporary concept of solidarity is not explicitly anti-
capitalist and steers away from political ideology, particularly since the integration of 
the socialist and christian traditions. Rather it focuses on a more pragmatic 
conception, that there are common interests among workers internationally, however 
weakly defined. It does, however, link to the objectives of the ‘post-cold war 
internationalists’ (Goldmann 1994: 2-3) who have driven the development of global 
economic and political institutions in order to promote a world ‘order’ and find 
common ground or ‘co-existence’.  
 Another key organizational principle of the Global Unions is subsidiarity, 
where the main power resides in local or regional structures with the central body 
carrying a framework-setting, coordinating and monitoring function. Marleau (2006) 
describes subsidiarity as also providing an ‘articulating device’, a way for different 
levels from local to central to find a way of linking within one structure. In the case of 
trade unions we can see that this idea of subsidiarity matches closely the doctrine of 
solidarism, a principle of social organization where individual and collective interests 
are interdependent and form a dialectical relationship. Marleau argues that this 
principle forms the basis for EU regulation and the ILO’s international standards, and 
the same is clearly true of the Global Unions, although they tend to place more 
emphasis on the coordinating function of the top level. 
 This generalized nature of the principles and the obligation between members 
helps explain the adaptability and subsequent durability of multilateral organizations. 
The principles are ‘principles of indivisibility’, that is they are not based on any 
particular set of interests and therefore exist and survive beyond particular 
circumstances.  
 
Self-Interest, diffuse reciprocity and the problem of large numbers 
The concept of collective or public goods is undeveloped in international relations, 
but has received growing attention since the 1990s, with the discussion of global 
public goods (Stiglitz 1999), revived interest in social justice (Long and Woolley 
2009) and failure of the WTO Doha round negotiations (Gallagher and Stoler 2009). 
Organizations generally provide collective goods which benefit both members and 
non-members (Olson 1965: 15), although most will also provide selective or private 
goods as an incentive to membership. One of the collective benefits of affiliation to a 
Global Union is increased power in relation to employers; a private good could be, for 
example, the increased leverage with employers of those unions participating in the 
negotiation of an IFA. 
 The net benefit of any collective good, as understood in traditional 
international relations theory, declines as total membership increases: a larger group 
is less efficient in providing a large amount of a collective good because of the 
reduction in identification between members, increased costs of organizing diverse 
memberships and reduced incentive for individual members to contribute. Large 
groups may lack the level of connection between members to generate sufficient 
levels of solidarity or persuasion for each member to believe that the benefits of 
cooperation justify the costs (Hardin 1982).  
 We would argue, however, that the size of membership for trade unions is a 
benefit in and of itself and as a result the collective good increases significantly with 
increased membership. Being a member of what are perhaps the largest 
membership organizations in the world is itself a collective good, and is perceived as 
such by trade unionists. This perception in turn defines the interests of members and 
therefore what self-interest comes to mean. For example, the function of interlocution 
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with international organizations, where the size of membership necessarily increases 
legitimacy and power, is something which national trade unions would be unable to 
replicate through a ‘myopic’ pursuit of self-interest (Oye 1986: 229-31). 
 Self-interest is also significant here, for example economic self-interest as a 
motivation for international organization by industrial sector or occupation. The 
classic explanation for international solidarity action relates to the elimination of 
competition over labour costs within a given company or industry. It closely fits the 
reasons behind the ITF’s successful international campaign to organise sea-farers, 
which remains the most successful of all Global Union actions to this day (Northrup 
and Rowan 1979), as well as the international coordination and action by trade union 
leaders in the engineering, chemical and food production industries from the 1950s 
to the 1980s (Bendiner 1987)., A closely related explanation is the presence of 
MNCs in such sectors, and the need for workers to organize a counter-power 
(Levinson 1972). This type of self interest can be said to apply most directly to 
industries that are well organised and in the exposed sector of national economies, 
that is, those most open to foreign competition (Crouch 1993). For many other 
industries, however, such as textiles or agriculture, either the absence of MNCs or 
the lack of union influence in the producing countries makes this form of international 
solidarity action too difficult and moves international solidarity actions closer to the 
‘charity’ concept of solidarity. 
 There are of course other forms of self-interest, most notably political self-
interest, which was a significant motivation for international trade union affiliation 
during the cold war (Carew 2000), when many national unions sought to further the 
foreign policy objectives of their own governments.  A related form of self-interest 
could be described as the self-interest of organisations in their own self-preservation, 
for example through the prestige and the resources made available to trade unions 
through international affiliation (Gumbrell-McCormick 2000). 
 The benefits of affiliation are often not the same for all members, for example 
IFAs offer different advantages for unions ranging from expanded influence of 
headquarter unions and basic organizing rights for unions operating in highly 
restrictive environments (ITUC, 2010). In many cases, particularly in relation to 
specific campaigns and solidarity action that support one or more national affiliates, 
the benefits and costs are diverse. This raises an important question about how self-
interest and advantage are conceptualized and measured by affiliates. Keohane’s 
idea (1986) of ‘diffuse reciprocity’ is extremely helpful for explaining how these 
complex calculations are made by affiliates of the global unions. Diffuse reciprocity 
exists when membership of a multilateral organization is expected to yield a rough 
equivalence of benefits between members in the aggregate and over the long term, 
rather than short-term pay-offs. This diffuse reciprocity is essential to the principle of 
solidarity and the daily work of the global unions.  
 The Global Unions provide a unique arena ‘where actions take place’ (Archer 
2001: 73) through articulating and aggregating interests. This arena provides an 
opportunity for socialization, particularly important for developing country unions 
which are often isolated and lack experience of operating at international and often 
diplomatic levels. Their motivation to join a Global Union is, in part, a ‘social-
communicative approach’ (Caporaso 1993: 66): affiliation provides an important 
sense of group identity and an opportunity for dialogue. 
 However, the size of the Global Unions and the resultant distance from 
individual members has been an important issue for internal debate. The sectoral 
GUFs might be considered closer to the base than the confederal ITUC, because the 
connection from the leadership to the individual member goes through fewer levels. 
Instead of dealing with national centres which must form common policies out of the 
disparate elements of their own affiliates, the GUFs only have to deal with individual 
unions with less diversity of interests. But this advantage may disappear entirely in 
the case of large multi-sectoral unions, increasingly common with the process of 
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union mergers at national level, and in the recent mergers among the GUFs (for 
example, the 2000 merger of FIET, PTTI, IGF and MEI to form UNI). In practice, 
therefore, for the GUFs as for the ITUC, the distance from the international to the 
individual worker is very great indeed. 
 This distance may have an important impact on perceived authority and 
legitimacy of the Global Unions. Authority and legitimacy are the foundation of trade 
union power: only if the members are convinced that the union is acting on their 
behalf, and are willing to apply collective pressure to support its goals can these be 
achieved. Effective trade unionism requires not just a ‘willingness to pay’ but also a 
‘willingness to act’ (Offe and Wiesenthal 1985). At national level, the authority of 
trade unions depends on their democratic accountability to their members. Martin 
(1989) has referred to this as internal authority, and Schmitter and Streeck (1999) as 
the logic of membership. At the same time, to be effective unions must be regarded 
as representative by outside bodies, such as employers, parties and governments – 
the logic of influence. External authority can be closely linked to internal authority – if 
members support the union, employers and governments will also take the union 
seriously – but their can also be tensions between the two logics, and this is reflected 
within the Global Unions in conflicts between the priorities of ‘agitation’ and 
‘diplomacy’ (Hyman 2005). 
 At international level the relationship between authority and legitimacy and 
the willingness of membership to act is complex and, at times, counterintuitive. There 
is, at times, an evident tension between the broad principles of the international trade 
union movement and the specific and complex actions required to carry them out. 
This is clear in the case of solidarity, where the policy itself is embraced but not the 
specific and demanding actions that need to take place in order for these principles 
to be upheld. This tension can be understood as an instance of Olson’s problem of 
large numbers: ‘the larger the group, the farther it will fall short of providing an 
optimal amount of a collective good’ (1965: 35). Whatever the limitations of Olson’s 
analysis, it correctly identifies the problem that group identity is not sufficient for the 
majority of Global Union members to carry out the level of solidarity action that is 
necessary.  
 This is in part a reflection of what Kahler (1992) calls the problem of latency: 
members tend to become passive in large diverse groups, particularly within weak 
federal structures. Latency occurs when an individual member not contributing to the 
collective good does not significantly affect any other member, and does not 
therefore provoke a response or action. Latency can be anticipated within Global 
Unions, given their complex and often opaque methods of operation and the inability 
of all but the largest affiliates to exert significant weight: most members may be 
inclined to withdraw and become passive. This is observable at international 
meetings, where discussion falls mainly into a diplomatic mode, rarely addressing 
difficult issues and respecting the relative weight of speakers. The verbatim 
proceedings of ICFTU congresses indicate that speakers from the largest, most 
influential western unions tend to speak more, and to speak on more general issues, 
while those from the developing countries speak mainly on matters directly affecting 
their country or region (Gumbrell-McCormick 2004). 
 
Institutional entrepreneurs, advocacy coalitions and policy communities 
Given the obstacles which typically confront collective action, policy initiatives require 
effective forms of pressure if they are to succeed. Here, the literature on institutional 
evolution and change (Thelen 2004) is of obvious relevance. As a number of writers 
have argued, new policies and organizational structures – even when necessitated 
by changed objective circumstances – are typically driven by ‘institutional 
entrepreneurs’ (Crouch 2005) or ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Mintrom and Norman 2009; 
Moravcsik 1999). In some readings – particularly influenced by analyses of the 
formal capacity of the European Commission to initiate new regulatory practices – 
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the key entrepreneur is the supranational executive apparatus; and clearly the 
elected leaderships of the Global Unions are crucial actors in stimulating (or at times 
obstructing) radical change. But within any international organization, specific 
affiliates or members may act in combination as drivers of change, and indeed any 
effective central leadership needs to build alliances between key members and 
construct bridges between their priorities and its own. In other words, multilateralism 
is often centrally constructed. 
 Initiating radical policy change typically requires a mobilizing discourse which 
identifies a fundamental challenge and persuasively depicts a solution (Schmidt 
2002). This in turn normally depends on the existence of a ‘policy community’ 
(Falkner 1998; Wright 1988) and the creation of an ‘advocacy coalition’ (Sabatier 
1988) which can press for the required policy shift. Such communities and coalitions 
may vary in composition according to the policy domain involved. Again, these 
analytical themes have obvious relevance for our understanding of how policies are 
created and recreated within Global Unions. We develop these perspectives below 
with our discussion of minilateralism and k-groups. 
 
Regionalism, minilateralism and k-groups  
Within large membership organizations there is an evident problem of cooperation 
across diverse interests and cultures. The smaller the group, the more likely it is that 
members will reach agreement and be able to coordinate action. In reality, most 
multilateral organizations are established and governed by a smaller subset of 
countries, and a common way to do this is through establishing regional cooperation 
(Oye 1986: 21).  
 Regions are not clearly defined or delineated by international organizations 
and may not share any linguistic or cultural commonalities. As we saw previously, 
there are differences in the degree of formal autonomy of trade union regional 
structures, particularly in Europe, but they all essentially follow the principle of 
subsidiarity. The developing regions are limited in their capacity for independent 
action because of their financial reliance on wealthier, mainly European and North 
American, affiliates. The relationship between regions and the global trade union 
bodies can be understood in terms of federalism, which may assume either strong or 
weak forms. Federalism (Fleiner et al. 2002) is understood here as a limitation on 
governmental power, dividing it both horizontally but also vertically between, in this 
case, regional structures with a clear functional division between national or regional 
levels and ‘supranational’ ones (Gumbrell-McCormick 2008: 326). In the main the 
affiliates of the Global Unions do not tend to confer more than an absolute minimum 
of power to the centre, preferring – like most states affiliated to multilateral structures 
– to maintain a ’weak confederalism’ (Stein 2008) in which core aspects of national 
sovereignty remain intact. Certainly they agree to pay dues to the international and 
accept the collective choice of leadership, although not always with good grace. But 
in practice they have rarely if ever agreed to delegate any substantial national 
powers of policy-making or negotiation to their global bodies. 
 It is important to note that the power structures of the Global Unions are far 
from unipolar (Jervis 2009): the US unions, with their low membership density, do not 
hold a disproportionate share of the ‘politically relevant resources of the system’ 
(Walt 2009: 91), while the European unions do not form a cohesive bloc. Authority, if 
measured through financial contributions, is widely dispersed across Europe and 
North America, with important contributions also from Japan and Australia.  
 If the Western European affiliates that established the Global Unions remain 
particularly influential, this is not simply a question of economic resources but also of 
political culture, and the socialist and democratic norms that European trade unions 
have often embraced. The multilateralism of the Global Unions can be seen as linked 
to the embeddedness of a unificatory and rule-based approach of Western European 
nations (Saxer 2009).  
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 These constellations of influence within the Global Unions are complex and 
typically involve smaller groupings than the regional, and tend to divide into two main 
types. The first we can describe as minilateral and the second we describe as k-
group cooperation. Multilateral organizations in international relations are ‘typically 
supported by a minilateral cooperation amongst the Atlantic powers’ (Kahler 1993: 
300); such small-group collaboration increases the effectiveness and intensity of 
common action within larger membership groups. K-groups (Snidal 1985) are 
subgroups which are small enough for the benefits of cooperation among their 
members to outweigh the costs, and whose collective action enables agreement on 
policy and practice.  
 
 
It is worth noting here that all too easily, this can involve an ‘in-group’ from unions 
with more resources, more developed transnational networks and typically English 
language skills exercising hegemony over affiliates lacking these advantages. Even 
though the objectives of such groups may be benevolent, it is at best a paternalistic 
form of solidarity. Wagner (2005:93) has noted a similar tendency within the ETUC: 
from the perspective of those outside the informal leadership ‘currently solidarities 
are more like alliances of interest between the rich countries’. Within the ITUC, there 
are indications that many unions from poorer countries feel similarly excluded from 
effective policy-making. This evidently corrodes the basis for solidaristic action: 
hence a major challenge is to develop a democratic, negotiated basis for 
minilateralism. 
 
The workings of multilateral organizations tend to reflect the politics and political 
cultures of such groups, as can be observed in many multilateral organizations which 
rely on working groups, committees and sometimes less formal groups of decision 
makers (Olson 1971). Kahler (1993: 300) calls this ‘disguised multilateralism’, and 
identifies two additional and non-hierarchical forms of minilateralism, the ‘broker’ and 
the ‘progressive club’. Both offer insights into minilateral cooperation within the 
Global Unions. In the former, a small group creates a focal point for carrying out 
activity. Often this role will be taken up by a union that, although not in the k-group, 
has significant political or moral authority. Such a ‘broker’ may be a ’missionary’ 
(Croucher and Cotton 2009: 55) or a ‘policy entrepreneur’, promoting particular 
issues and actions within the multilateral structure and vying for support.  
 A progressive club is a group of members with an agenda transcending the 
lowest common denominator. It could be understood using Olmsted’s sociological 
concept (1959) of a primary group: members have close personal ties and associate 
face-to-face. Their relationship is based on a profound sense of solidarity, which is 
both political and emotional. Their shared perception of reality is reinforced through 
continuous contact and joint creation of norms, roles and cultures. This is captured 
by Bales (1950: 79-80): ‘the heart of solidarity in the institutionalized sense is the 
stabilized mutual responsibility of each toward the other... as the sharer of a common 
fate, and as a person who is under obligation to cooperate with the other in the 
satisfaction of the other’s individual needs as if they were one’s own’.  
 Significant small groups within the Global Unions are those unions active in 
education work, both those that fund and support educational projects (particularly 
from the Netherlands and the Nordic countries), and those in the developing world 
that work in partnership with them. This is a distinct and important group within the 
Global Unions, not just because of their intense and involved work together but also 
because of the political impact of carrying out workers’ education and the 
relationships it engenders. We would argue that the level of small group cooperation 
based on progressive and politically important educational principles is a major 
progressive force within the global unions. Educational settings provide strong social 
incentives and crucial socialization between unions, often from different regions, 
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sufficient to shift the perception of self-interest and increase willingness to contribute 
to the collective good. An example of a ‘missionary’ group would be the individuals 
and unions that pushed the Global Unions and their affiliates to become more active 
around the issue of gender equality from the 1970s onwards. Again, the Nordic 
unions as well as the TUC and the German DGB played a leading role, as did 
particular individuals within the ICFTU secretariat. The development of international 
trade union action around the MNCs followed a similar process, mainly on the basis 
of the joint ICFTU-ITS Working Party on Multinational Enterprises with membership 
largely drawn from the same countries plus the United States and Canada 
(Gumbrell-McCormick 2000).  
 Most unions in developing regions are isolated from their counterparts 
elsewhere. It is an important benefit to join a Global Union, because of the exposure 
it brings to trade unionism more broadly and the pool of collective experience on 
which it is possible to draw. One of the key functions of the Global Unions, 
particularly in trade union education settings, is to gather and distribute experiences 
both of failure and, less often, success – providing crucial strategic and technical 
knowledge that can be used internationally.  
 
Conclusion 
 We have attempted to deepen understanding of the international trade union 
movement by applying an international relations framework, using the concepts of 
multilateralism and minilateralism. This helps us understand not only the difficulties 
that Global Unions face in engaging with and mobilizing their large memberships, but 
also the relative durability of these structures in the face of declining financial 
resources. We have used the multilateralism concept to explain their adaptability, 
deepened it by introducing the concept of minilateralism to characterize the small-
group cooperation that they exhibit. It is through such minilateral cooperation that 
sufficiently robust and involved relationships are formed to carry out demanding 
international work.  
  
 The perspective we have proposed should be at the heart of any diagnosis of 
the profound organizational problems that the Global Unions now face. By such 
understanding we hope to stimulate additional impetus for affiliates to make the 
ultimately political decision to strengthen and democratize their international 
structures. 
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Table 1: Declared and paying membership and fees received per region, ICFTU 1998 and 2003, ITUC 2009 
 
Region Declared membership (000) Paying membership (000) Fees (€ 000) 
 1998 2003 2009 1998 2003 2009 1998 2003 2009 
Central/East Europe 8,235 37,296 47,956 8,048 11,3016 25,761 116 195 282 
West Indies 420 383 220 424 387 182 3 4 5 
Western Europe 43,214 43,638 46,204 37,595 36,234 36,127 5,403 5,863 6,671 
North America 14,612 12,362 10,389 14,612 12,362 10,354 2,216 1,647 1,982 
Africa 8,942 10,591 13,880 8,454 10,254 12,171 132 68 97 
Asia and Pacific 27,907 27,283 32,248 18,112 14,708 18,082 1,468 1,490 1,652 
Latin America 19,362 16,468 24,510 19,254 7,439 16,001 30 4 103 
Middle East 748 1,274 1,282 745 1,271 1,284 38 5 57 
Total 123,441 149,294 176,689 107,244 93,957 119,963 9,406 9,277 10,848 
 
Source: ICFTU Financial Reports 2004, ITUC Financial Report 2010 
